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     1. Introduction 
 
In a recent paper (Kharbach, 2009), the unidirectional Hotelling model (UHM henceforth) has 
been  introduced.  While  in  the  standard  bidirectional  Hotelling  model  (BHM  henceforth) 
consumers have a bidirectional purchasing ability, in the UHM a consumer can buy only from 
firms located at his right or only from firms located at his left. The UHM can be used to describe 
spatial situations like highways or one way roads, or non revertible flows in gas and oil pipelines 
(Kharbach, 2009). In a location price game with uniform pricing and quadratic transportation 
costs, Kharbach (2009) shows that when consumers can buy only from firms located on their 
right (left), one firm locates in position  5 3  from the left (right) endpoint of the linear market, 
while the other firm locates at the right (left) endpoint.  
The aim of this article is twofold. In the first part, we study the location price equilibrium 
emerging within the UHM when spatial price discrimination is introduced.
1 We adopt a general 
class of transportation cost functions encompassing both linear and quadratic transportation costs 
and we show that in equilibrium one firm locates in the middle of the market, while the other 
locates at the right (left) endpoint of the segment when consumers can buy only from firms 
located on their right (left). 
In the second part of the article we develop an infinitely repeated game in order to investigate 
collusion sustainability within the UHM under spatial price discrimination. In particular, we are 
interested in the role of firms’ location.
2 We show that when consumers can buy only from firms 
located  on  their  right  (left),  the  maximum  collusive  profits  sustainable  in  equilibrium 
monotonically increase (decrease) with the location of the firm located at the right (left), while 
initially increase and then decrease with the location of the firm located at the left (right). 
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the UHM. In Section 3 we analyse 
the location price equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyse collusion sustainability in the repeated 
game framework. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix. 
 
2. The model 
 
Assume a linear  market of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the  market. 
Denote by  ] 1   , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each consumer. Each consumer consumes no more than 1 
unit of the good. Denote by v the reservation price. There are two firms, A and B, with zero 
marginal  costs,  located  respectively  at  a  and  b.  Without  loss  of  generality  we  assume 
1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ b a . Both firms can perfectly price discriminate. Denote by 
J
x p  the price set by firm 
B A J   , =  on a consumer located at x. As in Kharbach (2009) we assume that a consumer can buy 
                                                 
1 Location price games under price discrimination have received a lot of attention within the BHM. Lederer and 
Hurter (1986) show that with inelastic demand functions, equilibrium locations minimize transportation costs, thus 
maximizing welfare. Hamilton et al. (1989) assume downward sloping demand functions and show that when firms 
compete à la Bertrand equilibrium locations are strictly between the first and the third quartile, while when firms 
compete à la Cournot in equilibrium firms agglomerate in the middle. Hamilton and Thisse (1992) introduce two 
part tariffs, and show that in equilibrium firms locate at the first and the third quartile. 
2 Some authors have analyzed the relationship between firms’ location and collusion sustainability within the BHM 
under price discrimination. Gupta and Venkatu (2002), relying on grim trigger punishment mechanisms, show that 
in the case of elastic demand functions perfect collusion is easier to sustain the less firms are distant. Miklós Thal 
(2008) shows that when optimal punishment is introduced the result is the opposite. See also Colombo (2009) for the 
case of imperfect price discrimination.   2 
only  from  a  firm  located  on  his  right  hand  side.  We  maintain  the  specification  of  the 
transportation costs function as general as possible. Namely, let the transportation costs paid by a 
consumer  x  buying  from  firm  A  and  from  firm  B  be  given  by  the  functions: 
k x a t ) ( −   and 
k x b t ) ( −  respectively, with  1 ≥ k .
3 Therefore, the utility of a consumer located at x when he 




x x a t p v u ) ( − − − = , while the utility of a consumer located at x 




x x b t p v u ) ( − − − = . We assume  t v ≥  to ensure that 
the market is always covered. 
 
3. Location-price equilibrium 
 
In this section we study the location price equilibrium emerging in a two stage game where in 
the first stage the firms choose where to locate and in the second stage set the price schedules. 
The sub game Nash equilibrium concept is used in solving the game.  
In the second stage of the game firms choose simultaneously the price schedules given the 
locations. Consider the consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . The consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈  can 
buy from both firms. In order to avoid ε equilibria, we assume that if the utility of a consumer is 
the same when he buys from firm A and when he buys from firm B, he buys from the nearer 
firm.
4  The  equilibrium  prices  on  a  consumer  located  at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈   have  the  following 
characteristics: the firm which is further from consumer x (firm B) charges a price equal to the 
marginal costs (which are assumed to be zero in our model), while the nearer firm (firm A) sets a 
price equal to the difference between the transportation costs.
5 Then, firm A’s price schedule is: 
k k A
x x a t x b t p ) ( ) ( − − − = . Firm A serves all consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . Consider now the 
consumers located at  ] , [ b a x∈ . The consumers located between the two firms can buy only from 
firm B. Therefore, firm B sets the price schedule in such a way to extract the whole consumer 
surplus from the consumers located at  ] , [ b a x∈ . The equilibrium price schedule set by firm B on 
the consumers located between a and b is therefore:
k B
x x b t v p ) ( − − = . The consumers located at 
] 1   , (b x∈  cannot buy any product. Therefore, the profits functions of the two firms are: 
6 
 
                                     ) 1 ( ] ) ( [
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0
  , k a a b b t dx p
k k k a A
x
N A + − − − = = Π
+ + + ∫                                (1) 
 
                                    ) 1 ( ] ) ( ) 1 ( )[ (





N B + − − + − = = Π ∫                             (2) 
 
Taking the derivative of (1) and (2), we get:
7 
 
                                                 
3 Since a consumer can buy only from a firm located on his right hand side the possibility of “negative transportation 
costs” is excluded. 
4 This assumption is standard in spatial models. For more details, see among the others Hurter and Lederer (1985), 
Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse and Vives (1988), Hamilton et al. (1989), Hamilton and Thisse (1992). 
5 For a formal and general proof, see Lederer and Hurter (1986). 
6  Let us  use the  superscript N  to indicate the  equilibrium  profits.  This  will become  useful in  Section  4  when 
collusion will be introduced. 
7 It is immediate to see that  0
2   , 2 < ∂ Π ∂ a
N A  and  0
2   , 2 < ∂ Π ∂ b
N B , so the second order condition is satisfied.   3 
                                                     ] ) [(
  , k k N A a a b t a − − = ∂ Π ∂                                                   (3) 
 
                                                       
k N B a b t v b ) (
  , − − = ∂ Π ∂                                                     (4) 
 
Note that (4) is always larger than 0. Therefore, firm B locates at the right endpoint of the 
market. Then:  1 * = b . Solving  0
  , = ∂ Π ∂ a
N A  with respect to a we get the optimal location of 
firm A:  2 b a = . In equilibrium we get:  2 1 *= a . Therefore, when the consumers can buy only 
from firms located on the right hand side, one firm locates at the right endpoint of the market, 
while the other locates in the middle of the market (by symmetry, when the consumers can buy 
only from firms located on the left hand side, one firm locates at the left endpoint of the market, 
while the other locates in the middle of the market). The intuition is the following. Consider firm 
B. When both firms price discriminate, firm B monopolistically serves the consumers located 
between the two firms, but it cannot serve the consumers on the left of the rival. Since price 
discrimination allows firm B to extract the whole surplus from the consumers it serves, firm B 
has the incentive to maximize the demand. Therefore, firm B tries to expand its demand by 
locating as far as possible from firm A. For any firm A’s location firm B’s demand is maximized 
when firm B locates at the right endpoint of the segment. Consider now firm A. Firm A serves 
only consumers located on its left. Therefore, the higher is a, the higher is firm A’s demand. This 
effect coincides with the demand effect illustrated by Tirole (1988, p.281) for the location price 
game with uniform price and quadratic transportation costs. The demand effect pushes firm A to 
locate near to firm B in order to increase its own demand. However, firm A’s equilibrium price 
schedule  depends  also  on  the  distance  between  the  two  firms:  the  higher  is  product 
differentiation the higher is the price firm A can charge on each consumer buying from it. This 
coincides with the strategic effect discussed by Tirole (1988, p.281). The strategic effect pushes 
firm A far from firm B in order to soften competition. While in the BHM with uniform pricing 
firms and quadratic transportation costs the strategic effect dominates and determines maximal 
differentiation in equilibrium (D’Aspremont et al., 1979), in the UHM with price discrimination 
no effect dominates: the strategic effect and the demand effect are in equilibrium when firm A 





In this section, we consider the conditions of collusion sustainability within the UHM. In order to 
investigate collusion, we need to depart from the two stage game analysed in Section 3 and 
introduce an infinitely repeated game. We are mainly interested in evaluating the impact of the 
firms’ location over collusion sustainability. Locations are kept exogenous, and we analyse how 
variations in the locations’ parameters affect collusion sustainability. 
Suppose that firm A and firm B interact repeatedly in an infinite horizon setting. In supporting 
collusion,  the  firms  are  assumed  to  use  the  grim  trigger  strategy  of  Friedman  (1971).
8  The 
                                                 
8 Clearly, the grim trigger strategy is not optimal (Abreu, 1986). However, “this is one of very realistic punishment 
strategies because of its simplicity”, as argued by Matsumura and Matsushima (2005, p.263). The most part of the 
articles which study collusion sustainability through spatial models adopt the grim trigger strategy. See for example, 
Deneckere (1983), Chang (1991), Chang (1992), Friedman and Thisse (1993), Hackner (1994), Hackner (1995) and   4 
market discount factor,  ) 1   , 0 ( ∈ δ , is exogenous and common for each firm. Let us denote by 
C J   , Π , 
D J   , Π   and 
N J   , Π   respectively  the  collusive  profits,  the  deviation  profits  and  the 
punishment (or Nash) profits of firm  B A J , = . It is well known that collusion is sustainable as a 
sub game perfect equilibrium when the following incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied: 
 
                                       ]   , max[ *   ,   ,
  ,   ,
  ,   ,
  ,   ,
N B D B
C B D B
N A D A





≡ ≥δ δ                                        (5) 
 
Recall that consumers located between a and b cannot buy from firm A, and their surplus is 
totally extracted by firm B in the competitive set up. Therefore, a collusive agreement cannot 
generate higher profits than the competitive profits over consumers located between a and b: the 
collusive profits over consumers located between the two firms must coincide with the Nash 
profits obtained by firm B. However, a collusive agreement over the consumers located between 
0 and a may be profitable for both firms. Suppose a collusive agreement of this type: firm B 




  ,  which is strictly positive at least for some  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . This allows firm A to set a 
collusive  price  schedule 
k k C B
x
C A
x x a t x b t p p ) ( ) (
  ,   , − − − + = ,  which  is  strictly  larger  than  the 





  ,  the gross collusive profits obtained by firm A under the collusive agreement. In 
exchange for softening competition firm B receives a fraction s of the gross collusive profits of 
firm A. Therefore, the net collusive profits of firm A and firm B are respectively  Λ − = Π ) 1 (
  , s
C A  
and 
N B C B s
  ,   , Π + Λ = Π , where the second term in 
C B   , Π  refers to the fact the firm B monopolizes 
the consumers located at  ]   , [ b a x∈ .
9  
Note that, given the level of gross collusive profits  Λ, there exist many different collusive 
discriminatory  price  schedules  yielding  the  same  level  of  profits.
10  In  general,  finding  the 
optimal collusive price schedule for any given level of collusive profits would be very difficult. 
Nevertheless, we are able to characterize a condition for collusion sustainability which is based 
only on collusive profits and not on collusive prices. This allows us to perform the analysis by 
using directly profits functions instead of price schedules. 
First, note that firm A has never the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. In fact, 
the consumers located at  ]   , [ b a x∈  are always monopolized by firm B and cannot be stolen by 
firm A even if it deviates from the collusive agreement. On the contrary, the consumers located at 
]   , 0 [ a x∈  are served by firm A, and firm A cannot set a price higher than 
C A
x p
  ,  when firm B is 
setting the collusive price 
C B
x p
  , . Since the deviation profits are equal to the collusive profits, 
firm A has never the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. Let us consider now firm 
B. The deviation profits of firm B are defined in the following Lemma:  
                                                                                                                                                               
Matsumura  and  Matsushima  (2005).  Exceptions  are  Hackner  (1996)  and  Miklós Thal  (2008),  where  optimal 
punishments are assumed. 
9 Note that for collusion to be profitable for firm A, we have to impose  Λ Π − ≤
N A s
, 1 : this guarantees that firm A’s 
net collusive profits are higher than firm A’s Nash profits. 
10 The only exception is represented by perfect collusion, because in this case there is only one collusive price 
schedule generating perfect collusive profits (see later). For a similar problem, see Liu and Serfes (2007, Section 5).   5 
 
Lemma 1. The deviation profits of firm B are: 
N B N A D B   ,   ,   ,     Π + Π − Λ = Π . 
 
Substituting the collusive profits, the deviation profits and the punishment profits of firm B 
into (5) we get that collusion is sustainable if and only if:  
 
                                                   )   ( 1 *
  , N A s Π − Λ Λ − = ≥ δ δ                                                   (6) 
 
We state the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 2. If  δ − ≥1 s  any collusive profits Λ is sustainable in equilibrium. 
 
The intuition of Lemma 2 is straightforward. The higher is s, the higher are firm B’s collusive 
profits. When firm B’s participation in the gross collusive profits of firm A is sufficiently high 
(i.e.  δ − ≥1 s ), firm B has never the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement, whatever 
are the collusive profits  Λ firms agree upon and whatever are firms’ locations. Therefore, in 
order to investigate the effect of firms’ location on collusion sustainability, in the rest of this 
section we assume  δ − <1 s . 
Consider perfect collusion. Under perfect collusion, firm B completely renounces to compete 
over the consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ : in this case, firm A sets the (unique) discriminatory 
price schedule which extracts the whole surplus from the consumers located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ , that is: 
k C A
x x a t v p ) ( *
  , − − = . Perfect gross collusive profits are the following: 
 
                                             ) 1 (   * *
1
0
  , k ta va dx p
k a C A
x + − = = Λ
+ ∫                                             (7) 
 
It is immediate to see that  * Λ  is strictly increasing with a, while it does not depend on b. In 
fact, a higher a implies a larger subset of consumers over which the collusive agreement is 
profitable for both firms, while a higher b only increases the number of consumers monopolized 
by  firm  B.  Suppose  now  that  perfect  collusion  is  not  sustainable  as  a  sub game  perfect 
equilibrium because the market discount factor is too low. Note from (6) that the critical discount 
factor is strictly increasing with the gross collusive profits of firm A. Therefore, when perfect 
collusion is not sustainable, firms rationally agree on the maximum imperfect firm A’s gross 
collusive profits,  Λ , that can be sustained in equilibrium given the market discount factor. This 
profits level is simply obtained by solving (6) with respect to Λ. We get: 
 
                                                      ) 1 ( ) 1 (
  , δ δ − − Π − = Λ s
N A                                                  (8) 
 
From (3) we have that  0
  , > ∂ Π ∂ b
N A  and  0 ) (
  , ≤ ≥ ∂ Π ∂ a
N A  when  2 ) ( b a ≥ ≤ . Therefore, we 
can immediately state the following proposition: 
   6 
Proposition 1. The maximum imperfect collusive profits sustainable in equilibrium increase 
(decrease) with a when  2 ) ( b a ≥ ≤ , and monotonically increase with b.
11 
 
The intuition for Proposition 1 is the following. From (8) it follows that the higher is 
N A   , Π  
the higher are the maximum collusive profits that can be sustained in equilibrium. This is due to 
the fact the punishment profits of firm A coincide with the transportation costs firm B pays to 
steal firm A’s consumers (see the proof of Lemma 1). Therefore, an higher 
N A   , Π  implies lower 
firm B’s deviation profits, which in turn reduce the incentive for firm B to deviate from the 
collusive agreement. Consider now the impact of firms’ locations over 
N A   , Π . First, for given b, 
note that 
N A   , Π  increases with a (thus increasing the maximum collusive profits sustainable in 
equilibrium) when  2 b a ≤ , but decreases with a (thus decreasing the maximum collusive profits 
sustainable in equilibrium) when  2 b a ≥ . In fact, when a increases, the individual transportation 
costs decrease as firms are nearer (this is the analogous of the strategic effect analysed in Section 
3), but at the same time firm B steals more consumers, as the market of firm A increases with a 
(this is the analogous of the demand effect analysed in Section 3). As we showed in Section 3, 
when  2 b a ≤  the demand effect prevails: as a consequence the overall transportation costs of 
firm B increase with a; when  2 b a ≥  the strategic effect prevails: as a consequence the overall 
transportation costs of firm B decrease with a. Consider now the effect of an increase of b for 
given a. 
N A   , Π  increases with b, thus increasing the maximum collusive profits sustainable in 
equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward. A change in b does not modify firm A’s demand. 
Therefore, the demand effect does not arise. On the contrary, the distance between the firms 
increases with b. Therefore, the strategic effect arises: firm A’s punishment profits increase, and 
deviation profits of firm B decrease as firm B has to pay higher transportation costs in order to 
serve firm A’s consumers.  
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of firms’ location over the maximum collusive profits 
sustainable in equilibrium. Figure 1 considers the impact of a over collusion sustainability. First, 
consider the curve  * Λ  and the curve  Λ . The bold lines represent the collusive profits sustained 
in equilibrium as a function of a. When a is low enough ( ' a a ≤ ), perfect collusion is sustainable 
in  equilibrium,  as  Λ < Λ* .  Moreover,  a  higher  a  allows  higher  perfect  collusive  profits. 
However, when a is high enough ( ' a a ≥ ), perfect collusion is no more sustainable. Therefore, 
firms agree on imperfect collusive profits,  Λ , and the impact of a over the maximum collusive 
profits sustainable in equilibrium is negative.
12 Moreover, note from (7) that the slope of  * Λ  
depends positively on the reservation price, v, while the slope of  Λ  does not depend on v. In 
Figure 1, three different perfect collusive profits levels,  * Λ ,  * Λ &  and  * Λ & & , are represented. The 
higher is v, the steeper is the perfect collusive profits curve. It is immediate to see that the higher 
is v the lower is the intercept between the perfect collusive profits curve and  Λ . It follows that 
the higher is v, the narrower is the subset of a’s on which perfect collusion is sustainable. When v 
is sufficiently high (i.e. when the perfect collusive profits curve is  * Λ & & ), perfect collusion is 
                                                 
11 By symmetry, when consumers can buy only from firms located on the left hand side, the maximum imperfect 
collusive  profits  sustainable  in  equilibrium  increase  (decrease)  with  b  for  2 ) 1 ( ) ( a b + ≥ ≤   and  monotonically 
decrease with a. Details are omitted. 
12 In Figure 1 this depends on the fact that  2 ' b a ≥ . In general, the impact of a on  Λ  is positive as long as  2 b a ≤  
and is negative when  2 b a ≥ , as shown in Proposition 1.   7 
never sustainable in equilibrium whatever is firm A’s location. However, even if  a higher v 
reduces the possibility to sustain perfect collusion, a higher reservation price is beneficial for the 
colluding firms. In fact, as a consequence of a higher v, the level of the collusive profits that can 
be sustained in equilibrium increases: when v is sufficiently high, the maximum collusive profits 
constraint is binding everywhere, and the firms are able to collude on higher collusive profits, 
even if perfect collusion is impossible. To clarify this point, suppose for example that  2 b a = . 
Moreover, suppose that initially v is such that the perfect collusive profits are represented by the 
curve  * Λ . The maximum collusive profits constraint is not binding, and firms collude on perfect 
collusive profits  ) 2 ( * b a = Λ . Now, suppose that v increases: the perfect collusive profits curve 
is now  * Λ & . It is easy to see that when  2 b a = , the perfect collusive profits,  ) 2 ( * b a = Λ & , are 
not sustainable. The maximum collusive profits constraint is binding, and firms collude on the 
imperfect collusive profits  ) 2 ( b a = Λ . However, firms are benefited by the increase of v: the 
imperfect  collusive  profits  they  now  agree  upon,  ) 2 ( b a = Λ ,  are  higher  than  the  perfect 
collusive profits,  ) 2 ( * b a = Λ , which were sustained in equilibrium when v was lower. 
Figure 2 considers the impact of b over collusion sustainability. First, consider the curve  * Λ  
and  the  curve  Λ .  Proposition  1  shows  that  the  maximum  collusive  profits,  Λ ,  are  strictly 
increasing with firm B’s location, while perfect collusive profits do not depend on b. The bold 
line represents the collusive profits sustained in equilibrium as a function of b. Perfect collusive 
profits  are  sustainable  in  equilibrium  as  long  as  b  is  sufficiently  high  ( ' b b ≥ ).  When  b  is 
sufficiently low ( ' b b ≤ ), only imperfect collusive profits are sustainable in equilibrium, and the 
effect of firm B’s location over the level of maximum collusive profits sustainable in equilibrium 
is strictly positive. Finally, note that perfect collusive profits are a positive function of v. In 
Figure 2, three different perfect collusive profits levels,  * Λ ,  * Λ &  and  * Λ & & , are represented. The 
higher is v, the higher is the intercept between the perfect collusive profits curve and  Λ . When v 
is sufficiently high and perfect collusive profits are represented by curve  * Λ & & , perfect collusive 
profits cannot be sustained in equilibrium: the maximum collusive profits constraint is binding 




In this article we extended the unidirectional Hotelling model introduced by Kharbach (2009) to 
allow for price discriminating firms. We also adopted a more general class of transportation cost 
functions encompassing both linear and quadratic transportation costs. In the first part of the 
article, we investigated the location price equilibrium emerging in a two stage game where firms 
first choose locations and then set the prices. We showed that when consumers can buy only 
from firms located on their right (left), in equilibrium one firm locates in the middle, while the 
other firm locates at the right (left) endpoint. In the second part of the article, we adopted an 
infinitely  repeated  game  in  order  to  focus  on  the  impact  of  firms’  location  over  collusion 
sustainability. We showed that when consumers can buy only from firms located on their right 
(left),  the  maximum  imperfect  collusive  profits  sustainable  in  equilibrium  monotonically 
increase (decrease) with the location of the firm located at the right (left), while initially increase 
and then decrease with the location of the firm located at the left (right). A higher reservation 
price of consumers makes perfect collusion less sustainable in equilibrium ceteris paribus, but 
allows firms to agree on higher (albeit imperfect) collusive profits.    8 
 







Proof  of  Lemma  1.  Consider  first  the  consumers  located  at  ]   , [ b a x∈ .  Firm  B,  both  under 
collusion  and  under  punishment,  extract  the  whole  consumer  surplus  from  these  consumers. 
Therefore, firm B has never the incentive to deviate from the collusive price schedule and obtains 
N B   , Π . Consider now a consumer located at  ]   , 0 [ a x∈ . We assume that when the consumer is 
indifferent between the deviating firm and the colluding firm, he buys from the deviating firm.
13 




x x b t p v x a t p v ) ( ) (
  ,   , − − − = − − − .  It  follows  that: 
k k C A
x
D B
x x b t x a t p p ) ( ) (
  ,   , − − − + = . 
Aggregating  the  deviation  prices  over  the  consumers  stolen  by  firm  B,  we  get: 
N A a k k a C A
x
a D B





  , ] ) ( ) ( [ Π − Λ = − − − − = ∫ ∫ ∫ .  It  follows  that  the  overall  firm  B’s 
deviation profits are 
N B N A D B   ,   ,   ,     Π + Π − Λ = Π .                                                                               ■ 
 
Proof  of  Lemma  2.  Define  1 )   (
  , > Π − Λ Λ ≡
N A w .  Suppose  γ δ + − =1 s ,  where  0 ≥ γ . 
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